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The population ethics of belief:
in search of an epistemic Theory X∗
Richard Pettigrew, University of Bristol†
Abstract
Consider Phoebe and Daphne. Phoebe has credences in 1 million propositions. Daphne,
on the other hand, has credences in all of these propositions, but she’s also got credences
in 999 million other propositions. Phoebe’s credences are all very accurate. Each of
Daphne’s credences, in contrast, are not very accurate at all; each is a little more accu-
rate than it is inaccurate, but not by much. Whose doxastic state is better, Phoebe’s or
Daphne’s?
It is clear that this question is analogous to a question that has exercised ethicists
over the past thirty years. How do we weigh a population consisting of some number
of exceptionally happy and satisfied individuals against another population consisting
of a much greater number of people whose lives are only just worth living? This is the
question that occasions population ethics. In this paper, I go in search of the correct
population ethics for credal states.
We start with an example:
Birders Consider two birders, Phoebe and Daphne. Phoebe has credences in 1
million propositions. All of them concern songbirds: they concern the habitats of
particular songbirds, their range, varieties, markings, etc. Daphne, on the other
hand, has credences in all of these propositions, but she’s also got credences in
999 million other propositions. They concern other bird species in the passer-
ine family besides the songbirds. They concern the habitats of these birds, their
range, varieties, markings, etc. Phoebe’s credences in all 1 million propositions to
which she assigns credences are all very accurate in the following sense: her cre-
dences in true propositions are extremely high — she’s nearly 100% confident in
each — whereas her credences in false propositions are very low — she’s nearly
0% confident in each. Each of Daphne’s credences, in contrast, are not very accu-
rate at all; each is a little more accurate than it is inaccurate, but not by much —
she’s between 50% and 51% confident in each truth and between 49% and 50%
confident in each falsehood.
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Whose doxastic state is better from the purely epistemic point of view, Phoebe’s or Daphne’s?
That is, which has greater purely epistemic value?
Let us suppose, as we will throughout this paper, that the epistemic utility of a credence
is given by its accuracy. A credence in a true proposition has greater accuracy — and thus, on
this proposal, greater epistemic utility — the higher it is. And a credence in a false proposi-
tion has greater accuracy — and thus again, on this proposal, greater epistemic utility — the
lower it is. That is, we will assume a sort of veritism about the epistemic value of credences
(Joyce, 1998; Goldman, 2002). Of course, this is not the only account of epistemic utility
available: we might say that the epistemic utility of a given credence in a proposition for a
particular agent is the proximity of that credence to whichever credence is best supported
by the agent’s evidence — its proximity to the evidential probability of the proposition, if
you like. Nonetheless, veritism is the account we will assume here. While I do think it is the
correct account, my purpose in selecting it is not for its veracity; it is rather that this account
is worked out in sufficient detail to make a useful case study of the sort of problem I wish to
address here.
Now, let us return to Phoebe and Daphne. Daphne has opinions about vastly more
propositions than Phoebe. But, by the lights of veritism, which we assume throughout, each
of her credences is significantly worse than each of Phoebe’s, epistemically speaking. Our
question is just this: how do we weigh having credences with very high positive epistemic
utility in some number of propositions against having credences with only slightly positive
epistemic utility in some much greater number of propositions?
Now, it is clear that this question is analogous to a question that has exercised ethicists
— and, in particular, utilitarians — over the past thirty years. How do we weigh a popu-
lation consisting of some number of exceptionally happy and satisfied individuals against
another population consisting of a much greater number of people whose lives are only just
worth living? This is the question that occasions population ethics. As Derek Parfit noted,
total utilitarianism in ethics — the view that the goodness of a population is simply the sum
of the utilities of the individuals that comprise it — will sometimes say that the latter pop-
ulation is better than the former. He called that result the repugnant conclusion and took it
to show that total utilitarianism isn’t a viable theory in ethics. He then noted that certain
natural alternatives also have unacceptable consequences. And he set ethicists the task of
finding Theory X, a theory that gives a plausible ordering by their goodness of populations
containing different individuals and different numbers of individuals (Parfit, 1984). In this
paper, I go in search of Theory X for credal states. A putative epistemic Theory X will give an
epistemic goodness ordering of credal states that are defined on different sets of propositions
that come in different sizes.
I am not the first to embark on this search. Jennifer Carr (ta) has already furnished us with
a host of valuable insights about the consequences of certain initially tempting orderings of
credal states by their epistemic goodness. I begin in this paper by considering these insights
and expanding on them. They appear to raise serious problems for Total Epistemic Utilitari-
anism, the epistemic Theory X that I will ultimately defend. However, before turning to that
defence in Section 3.4, I wish to consider whether there is an alternative epistemic Theory
X that escapes the objections that Carr raises. By appealing to analogues of impossibility
theorems from population ethics, we can see that any epistemic Theory X must of necessity
face substantial problems. I conclude by arguing that the problems with Total Epistemic
Utilitarianism can be overcome.
2
1 Carr on epistemic utility theory
Before I consider Carr’s observations in detail, I’d like to note a difference between my ap-
proach and hers. There are two ways to raise concerns about a putative ordering of certain
items in terms of their goodness. On the first, we appeal directly to intuitions about the rela-
tive goodness of the items in question; we note that those intuitions conflict with the verdict
given by the ordering we are criticizing; and we claim that this gives us reason to reject that
ordering. For instance, take the case of population ethics. There, an example of this first
way of objecting to a putative ordering of populations by goodness might run as follows:
we note that the ordering ranks population A above population B; and we note that, intu-
itively, we take population B to be better than population A. This is the approach I will take
to the population ethics of credences in Section 2. Carr, on the other hand, takes an alter-
native approach. She appeals to intuitions about what is rationally required or prohibited
or permitted for someone who must choose between those items; she notes that those intu-
itions conflict with what we might think would follow about rationality if the ordering we
are considering were the true ordering of those items by their goodness; and she worries that
this gives us reason to reject that ordering. For instance, again take the case of population
ethics. There, an example of this second style of objection to a putative ordering might run
as follows: we note that the ordering ranks population A above population B; we infer that
the ordering therefore tells us to choose to bring about A instead of B if those are the only
two options available to us; and we note that, intuitively, it is at least rationally permissible
to choose to bring about population B instead of population A given such a choice.
Thus, Carr and I both assume veritism, the account of epistemic utility on which the sole
fundamental source of epistemic utility is accuracy. Carr adds to this theory of epistemic
utility a theory of how facts about the rationality of credal states is determined by facts about
their epistemic utility. In particular, she appeals to standard decision-theoretic principles to
do that. This results in a species of epistemic consequentialism that has been called epistemic
decision theory or accuracy-first epistemology (Joyce, 2009; Greaves, 2013; Pettigrew, 2016). We
will have more to say about it below.
1.1 The framework of epistemic utility theory
In order to state Carr’s concerns, let’s introduce a little notation.
1.1.1 Credence functions
We seek an ordering of credal states by their goodness. We represent a credal state by a
credence function. An agent’s credence function at a given time is a function c defined on a set
of propositions F . It takes each X in F and returns c(X), which gives the agent’s credence in
X at that time. By convention, we say that 0 is minimal credence and 1 is maximal credence.
Thus, for each X in F , 0 ≤ c(X) ≤ 1. We call F the opinion set of c. We will assume
throughout that F is a finite set. But we will also assume that there are infinitely many
propositions that lie outside F and that might be added to it in order to expand it.
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1.1.2 Global epistemic utility ordering
On the veritist or accuracy-first account of epistemic utility that we’ll consider here, the epis-
temic utility of a credence function depends in part on the way the world is; in particular,
it depends in part on whether the propositions to which the credence function assigns cre-
dences are true or false. Thus, what we seek is an ordering of credence functions for each
way the world is. Thus, if w is a possible world, then we seek an ordering w of credence
functions by their epistemic goodness or utility at w. We write c w c′ if c′ is at least as
epistemically good as c at w. We will call w the global epistemic utility ordering for w. And
we will write c ≺w c′ if c w c′ but c′ 6w c; and we will write c ∼w c′ if c w c′ and c′ w c.
1.1.3 Local epistemic utility function
In ethics, Theory X is an account of how the goodness of whole populations relates to the
welfare or utility of the individuals that comprise them. This is true also in epistemology.
Theory X is puzzling for those of us who hold that there is a sensible notion of purely epis-
temic utility, at least for individual doxastic states, such as particular credences assigned to
particular propositions. Thus, the final component of our framework is a local epistemic util-
ity function, sX, for each proposition X. The function sX takes a truth-value and a credence
and returns the local epistemic utility of having that credence in X at a world at which it has
that truth-value. By convention, we represent the truth-values numerically, so that 1 stands
for truth and 0 for falsity. Thus, for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, sX(1, x) gives the local epistemic utility
of having credence x in X when X is true, while sX(0, x) gives the local epistemic utility of
having credence x in X when X is false. A little notation that will be useful later: given a
possible world w and a proposition X, we will write w(X) for the numerical truth-value of
X at w, so that w(X) = 1 if X is true at w and w(X) = 0 if X is false at w. Thus, given a
credence function c and a possible world w, the local epistemic utility at w of the credence
that c assigns to X is sX(w(X), c(X)).1
As we noted above, we are assuming veritism for credences in this paper. So it is reason-
able to assume that the epistemic utility of a credence in a proposition at a world depends
only on the credence, the proposition, and the truth-value of that proposition at the world
in question. If we took a more evidentialist line, we’d need to allow the epistemic utility of
a credence to vary with the agent’s evidence as well. As well as assuming that an agent’s
epistemic utility is not a function of her evidence, the version of veritism we will consider
here also assumes that the epistemic utility of an individual credence in a proposition is not
a function of the process by which it was formed, nor a function of the other credences that
the agent assigns. That is not to say that it denies that some processes are better than others;
nor is it to say that the contribution of an individual credence to the overall epistemic utility
of an agent’s credal state does not depend on the other credences that comprise that credal
state. Rather, this version of veritism assumes only that, whatever goodness a process has,
it is determined by the epistemic utilities of the individual credences to which that process
gives rise, rather than the other way round. And it assumes that the contribution made by an
individual credence to the overall epistemic utility of a credal state is determined by taking
the epistemic utility of that credence, as well as the epistemic utilities of all the other indi-
vidual credences that comprise that state, and aggregating them appropriately. This leaves
1For the cognoscenti: sX(i, x) can be thought of as the negative of a scoring rule (Predd et al., 2009).
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open that the effect of each individual credence on the epistemic utility of the overall state
might change depending on what other credences belong to that state.
Now, in what follows, we’ll sometimes assume that our local epistemic utility function
has certain properties. I list them here for ease of reference. The first property is truth-
directedness.2 This is a natural assumption if you think that the epistemic utility of a credence
is determined only by its accuracy, as we do here. It says that the epistemic utility of a
credence in a truth is an increasing function of that credence, while the epistemic utility of
a credence in a falsehood is a decreasing function of that credence; and it says that maximal
credence in a truth is better than maximal credence in a falsehood, while minimal credence
in a falsehood is better than minimal credence in a truth.
Truth-Directedness For all propositions X,
(i) sX(1, x) is a strictly increasing function of x;
(ii) sX(0, x) is a strictly decreasing function of x;
(iii) sX(0, 1) < 0 < sX(1, 1) and sX(1, 0) < 0 < sX(0, 0)
The second assumption we will make in some places below is that the local epistemic utility
function is strictly proper. This means that, when we evaluate the expected epistemic utility
of the various possible credences in a proposition X from the point of view of a particular
given credence p in X, the given credence p expects itself to be epistemically the best out of
all of them.
Strict Propriety For all propositions X, if 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, then
psX(1, x) + (1− p)sX(0, x)
is maximized, as a function of x, at x = p.
This is a popular assumption in the literature on epistemic utility arguments for epistemic
norms.3 For instance, Predd et al. (2009) show that, together with Partial Additivity and Con-
tinuity (below), it can be used in the service of an argument for Probabilism, the norm that
says that a rational agent will have a probabilistic credence function. We will have more to
do with this argument below. Greaves & Wallace (2006) show that the other central Bayesian
principle, Conditionalization, can also be derived using Strict Propriety together with some
additional assumptions; Pettigrew (2014) shows that Strict Propriety combined with slightly
different additional assumptions entails the Principle of Indifference; and Pettigrew (2013)
motivates the Principal Principle from Strict Propriety together with further assumptions
that are slightly different again. Joyce (2009, 279) sketches an argument in favour of a close
relative of Strict Propriety that might be deployed from the point of view of many different
accounts of epistemic utility, including more evidentialist ones; and Pettigrew (2016, Chap-
ter 4) gives an alternative argument in favour of Strict Propriety from the point of view of
veritism, in particular.
The third and final assumption we will make at various points below is that local epis-
temic utility is a continuous function of credence.
2The term is due to Joyce (2009), though he omits clause (iii) from the definition.
3Strict Propriety entails clauses (i) and (ii) of Truth-Directedness (Gneiting & Raftery, 2007, 363).
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Utility Continuity For any proposition X, sX(0, x) and sX(1, x) are both contin-
uous functions of x.
Here are two families of local epistemic utility functions, each of whose members satisfy
Truth-Directedness, Strict Propriety, and Utility Continuity. Their details won’t concern us in
what follows, but it might be useful to have them in mind. Both families are parameterized
by two values, 0 < λ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
• Quadratic scoring rule
(a) qα,λ(1, x) = α− λ(1− x)2;
(b) qα,λ(0, x) = α− λx2.
• Logarithmic scoring rule4
(a) lα,λ(1, x) = α+ λln x;
(b) lα,λ(0, x) = α+ λln (1− x).
1.2 Total Epistemic Utilitarianism
Having stated the framework in which we’ll be working, we can turn to Carr’s treatment of
what we might call total epistemic utilitarianism:
Total Epistemic Utilitarianism If c and c′ are credence functions defined on opin-
ion sets F and F ′ respectively, then
c w c′ iff ∑
X∈F
sX(w(X), c(X)) ≤ ∑
X′∈F ′
sX′(w(X′), c′(X′))
That is, one credence function is at least as good as another if the sum of the epistemic
utilities of the credences assigned by the first is at least as great as the sum of the epistemic
utilities of the credences assigned by the second.
Carr draws out unexpected and apparently unappealing consequences of this position.
The theorem that follows (Theorem 2) is simply a generalization of the central observations
in (Carr, ta, Sections 3.4-3.5). To state it, we require some terminology. First, the notion of an
epistemically neutral credence.
Definition 1 Suppose s is a local epistemic utility function, x is a credence, and X is a proposition.
Then, if sX(1, x) = sX(0, x), we say that x is an epistemically neutral credence in X relative to
s.
That is, a credence is epistemically neutral if it has the same epistemic utility regardless of
how the world turns out. For instance, for any member qα,λ of the family of quadratic scoring
rules, 0.5 is the unique epistemically neutral credence, since qα,λ(1, 0.5) = qα,λ(0, 0.5). And
similarly for any member lα,λ of the family of logarithmic scoring rules. Now, we have the
following result, which tells us that epistemically neutral credences always exist, providing
we make certain assumptions about our local epistemic utility function.
4ln x is the natural logarithm of x. That is, ln x := loge x. So ln x is the power to which one must raise e to
give x — that is, eln x = x for x > 0.
6
Proposition 1 Suppose that s is truth-directed and continuous. Then every proposition has a unique
epistemically neutral credence.
(All proofs are given in the Appendix.) Given a proposition X, we denote its epistemically
neutral credence rX.
Our second piece of terminology. We say that a credence function c is strictly dominated if
there is another credence function c∗ such that c ≺w c∗ for all worlds w. That is, c is strictly
dominated if there is c∗ that is guaranteed to be better than c.5
Our third piece of terminology. We say that a proposition X is an open proposition if,
for any probability 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, there is some evidential situation in which an agent might
find herself such that the unique rational response to that situation is to assign credence r
to X. Thus, for instance, take the proposition The coin will land heads on its next toss. For
any 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, I might learn that the objective chance of that proposition is r, since I might
learn that that is the bias of the coin towards heads. Thus, by the Principal Principle, in such
a situation, I would be rationally required to assign credence r to that proposition (Mellor,
1971; Lewis, 1980; Joyce, 2009).
We can now state our first theorem.
Theorem 2 Suppose that s is truth-directed, strictly proper, and continuous. And suppose that
the epistemic utility ordering w is governed by Total Epistemic Utilitarianism. Then one of the
following is true:
(a) For all ε > 0, there is a proposition X whose epistemically neutral credence is below ε — that
is, 0 ≤ rX < ε;
OR
(b) There is a credence r and an open proposition X such that every credence function that assigns
r to X is strictly dominated — that is, if c(X) = r, then there is c∗ such that c ≺w c∗ for all
worlds w.
The proof — given in full detail in the Appendix — runs as follows. Either (i) there is an
open proposition X whose epistemically neutral credence rX is guaranteed to have negative
epistemic utility; or (ii) every open proposition has an epistemically neutral credence that
is guaranteed to have positive epistemic utility. We then show that, if (i), then (b) holds;
and if (ii) holds and (a) is false, then (b) holds. If (i) holds, then any credence function that
assigns rX to X is strictly dominated by the credence function that results from removing X
from its opinion set. If (ii) holds and (a) is false, then, for any credence function, it is always
possible to choose a series of open propositions so that, if we add them all to the opinion set
of that credence function and assign them their epistemically neutral credence, the resulting
expanded credence function strictly dominates the original one. Since this holds of any
credence function, there is certainly a credence r and an open proposition X such that every
credence function that assigns r to X is strictly dominated by an expanded credence function,
and thus strictly dominated, as required by (b).
5To avoid confusion, note that there is a possible alternative use of this terminology that is analogous to
certain uses in the population ethics literature. We might say that, if c∗ and c are credence functions defined on
the same set of propositions, then c∗ strictly dominates c at a particular world if, for each proposition to which
c and c∗ assign a credence, the epistemic utility at that world of the credence that c∗ assigns to it is higher than
the epistemic utility at that world of the credence that c assigns to it. This is not our usage, and the terminology
will not be employed in this way in our article.
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Thus, if we make the assumptions on local epistemic utility functions that are standardly
made in the literature on accuracy-first or epistemic utility arguments for epistemic norms,
and if we assume that one credence function is epistemically at least as good as another if
the total epistemic utility of the first is at least as great as the total epistemic utility of the
second, then we are faced with a dilemma between two unappealing consequences.
• First possibility (a). According to (a), there are propositions whose epistemically neu-
tral credence is as close to 0 as we wish. This is bizarre and certainly flies in the face
of veritism. It means, for instance, that there is a proposition such that a credence
of 0.0000001 in that proposition is just as epistemically good if the proposition is true
as if it’s false. Another consequence: There is a proposition and a credence in that
proposition such that the credence would sanction taking a bet that wins you £1 if
the proposition is false and loses you £1billion if the proposition is true, but which is
equally good epistemically speaking whether or not the proposition is true or false.
• Second possibility (b). According to (b), there is a credence and an open proposition
such that, if the credence is assigned to the proposition, then the resulting credence
function is strictly dominated. This, too, is bizarre. After all, in decision theory, if
one option is dominated by another, the first is taken to be irrational. Thus, according
to this second possibility, there is a credence and an open proposition such that it is
always irrational to assign that credence to that proposition. But, by the definition
of an open proposition, there are situations in which an agent is not only rationally
permitted to assign that credence to that proposition but is rationally obliged to.
This second possibility (b) seems particularly troubling for those who would appeal to
epistemic utility to justify principles such as Probabilism. After all, the accuracy-first
argument for Probabilism given by Joyce (1998, 2009) is based on the following result:
(I) For every non-probabilistic credence function c, there is a probabilistic credence
function c∗ defined on the same opinion set as c that is guaranteed to be better than c.
(II) For every probabilistic credence function c, there is no credence function c∗ defined
on the same opinion set as c that is guaranteed to be at least as good as c.
He then hopes to apply a decision-theoretic principle to derive Probabilism. How-
ever, to apply such a principle, he would need something stronger than (I) and (II). He
would need:
(I’) For every non-probabilistic credence function c, there is a probabilistic credence
function c∗ that is guaranteed to be better than c.
(II’) For every probabilistic credence function c, there is no credence function c∗ that is
guaranteed to be at least as good as c.
(I’) follows from (I), but the second possibility (b) above directly contradicts (II’). It tells
us that there is a credence r and a proposition X such that every credence function that
assigns r to X is strictly dominated. But of course there will be probability functions
amongst those credence functions that assign r to X. So there will be probability func-
tions that are strictly dominated, contra (II’). I will argue in Section 3.4 that this does
not in fact cause a problem for Joyce’s argument. Indeed, my main concern with Carr’s
approach is that I do not think that Total and Average Epistemic Utilitarianism have
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the consequences for rationality that are suggested by Theorem 2 above and Theorem
3 below.
1.3 Average Epistemic Utilitarianism
A natural alternative to Total Epistemic Utilitarianism is Average Epistemic Utilitarianism:
whereas the former orders credence functions by their total epistemic utility, the latter orders
them by their average epistemic utility.
Average Epistemic Utilitarianism If c and c′ are credence functions defined on
F and F ′ respectively, then
c w c′ iff 1|F | ∑X∈F
sX(w(X), c(X)) ≤ 1|F ′| ∑X′∈F ′
sX′(w(X′), c′(X′))
where |F | is the number of propositions in F , and |F ′| is the number of propo-
sitions in F ′.6
Average Epistemic Utilitarianism avoids the problems raised by Theorem 2 above.7 How-
ever, Average Epistemic Utilitarianism suffers from a problem similar to the one raised for
Total Epistemic Utilitarianism by Theorem 2(b). Suppose that having maximal credence in a
truth is at least as good as having minimal credence in a falsehood. Then, as Carr points out,
if I have credences only in tautologies, and if I assign credence 1 to each of these tautologies,
then Average Epistemic Utilitarianism seems to prohibit me from assigning non-extremal
credence to any new proposition. After all, such a move is guaranteed to reduce my average
accuracy. But, as we noted above, for any credence and any proposition, there is a situation
in which it is rationally permitted to have that credence in that proposition. And, mutatis
mutandis, if having minimal credence in a falsehood is at least as good as having maximal
credence in a truth. Another way to put this is to note the following theorem:
Theorem 3 Suppose that s is truth-directed. And suppose that the epistemic utility ordering w is
governed by Average Epistemic Utilitarianism. Then, any credence function that assigns any non-
extremal credences is strictly dominated.
If we apply the dominance principle that we introduced above, it follows from Theorem
3 that, in the presence of Average Epistemic Utilitarianism, every non-extremal credence
function — that is, every credence function that assigns at least some non-extremal credences
— is irrational. This is analogous to the usual worry about the version of utilitarianism in
ethics that is analogous to Average Epistemic Utilitarianism: that position entails that, if I
have a population of a million deliriously happy people, it is impermissible to create a new
person who I know will only be very, but not deliriously, happy.
As with Total Epistemic Utilitarianism, Average Epistemic Utilitarianism seems to have
unacceptable consequences for rationality. In fact, as I mentioned above, I will deny that they
really have these consequences. I will instead make trouble for these proposals and many
6Recall: we are restricting attention to credence functions with finite opinion sets in this article. Thus, 1|F | and
1
|F ′ | are always well-defined.
7The reason is this: if you look to the proof of Theorem 2 in the Appendix below, equation (2) does not
entail that c∗ strictly dominates c when we assume Average Epistemic Utilitarianism instead of Total Epistemic
Utilitarianism.
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others by identifying unintuitive features of the epistemic utility orderings themselves, in-
dependent of their consequences for rationality. Indeed, I will show that trouble looms for
any putative epistemic Theory X, just as happens in the ethical case. I will end by arguing
that Total Epistemic Utilitarianism is nonetheless the best population ethics for credences.
2 The Paradox of Epistemic Utility for Credences
In this section, we are concerned not with assessing putative epistemic utility orderings by
looking to their consequences concerning what is rational; instead, we will assess them di-
rectly by looking at how they order certain pairs of credence functions. We are thus assessing
them in the way that orderings of populations are often assessed in the most well-known ar-
guments in population ethics. Indeed, we’ll be considering an adaptation of the epistemic
analogue of Parfit’s Mere Addition Paradox. Our paradox — which we will call the Para-
dox of Epistemic Utility for Credences — consists of four plausible but jointly inconsistent
principles that are taken to govern our epistemic utility ordering of credence functions.
2.1 Partial Additivity
The first of our four plausible principles that together constitute this Paradox states that, for a
particular class of cases in which Total and Average Epistemic Utilitarianism are guaranteed
to agree, they are right. These are the cases in which the two credence functions that we are
comparing are defined on the same opinion set:
Partial Additivity If c, c′ are credence functions defined on F , then
c w c′ iff ∑
X∈F
sX(w(X), c(X)) ≤ ∑
X∈F
sX(w(X), c′(X))
Thus, if Debby and Lili both have credences in the same propositions, then Debby’s credence
function is at least as good as Lili’s just in case her total epistemic utility is at least as high as
Lili’s (and, equivalently, her average epistemic utility is at least as high as Lili’s).
Note that the ethical analogue of this principle is subject to the usual objections to utili-
tarianism in ethics, namely, that it permits us to trade-off the misery of the few in favour of
the joy of the many. As a result, many population ethicists would not assume a principle like
this. For them, equality is an important virtue of a population and Partial Additivity pays
no attention to this. Rather, they assume something like Non-Anti-Egalitarianism, which
says that, if A and B are two populations of the same size and if A has at least as great total
and average utility as B whilst also being at least as equal as B, then A is at least as good as
B, all things considered (Ng, 1989; Arrhenius, 2000; Huemer, 2008).8 We need have no such
qualms and we need not qualify Partial Additivity in this way. There is no extrinsic or intrin-
sic value to having credences with equal epistemic utility. And indeed, at least in the pres-
ence of veritism, it would be a bizarre claim. After all, suppose I have credences concerning
the outcome of a fair lottery with 1 million tickets. Then, if wi is the proposition that ticket i
wins, we presumably think that it would be at least as good for me to assign a credence of
1
1,000,000 to each wi,
2
1,000,000 to each wi ∨ wj (for distinct i, j), 31,000,000 to each wi ∨ wj ∨ wk (for
8The name of the principle is due to Ng (1989, 238) and adopted by Arrhenius (2000, 253). In discussion of
distributive justice, this principle is sometimes known as the Pigou-Dalton Principle (Pigou, 1912; Dalton, 1920).
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distinct i, j, k), and so on, as to assign a credence of 12 to each wi,
1
2 to each wi ∨ wj, 12 to each
wi ∨ wj ∨ wk, and so on. However, if we favour equality of credences, the latter will often be
preferable. For many epistemic utility functions, all of the credences in the latter assignment
will have the same epistemic utility, since, according to those epistemic utility functions, a
credence of 12 in any truth has exactly the same epistemic utility as a credence of
1
2 in any
falsehood — that is, in the language of Section 1.2, 12 is the epistemically neutral credence for
every proposition. On the other hand, for any truth-directed epistemic utility function, the
credences in the former assignment will have epistemic utilities that span nearly the whole
gamut of possible epistemic utility values from extremely accurate to extremely inaccurate,
since it will include a credence of 11,000,000 in a truth and the same credence in a falsehood,
and it will include a credence of 999,9991,000,000 in a falsehood and the same credence in a truth.
Thus, unlike in the ethical case, it seems that equality is no virtue in the credal case.
A major virtue of Partial Additivity is its role in epistemic arguments for various prin-
ciples of credal rationality, such as Probabilism, Conditionalization, the Principal Principle,
and so on. The strongest argument for each of these principles assumes Strict Propriety,
Utility Continuity, and either Partial Additivity or a strengthening of it that concerns the or-
dering of credence functions by their expected epistemic utility relative to some probability
distribution (Predd et al., 2009; Greaves & Wallace, 2006; Pettigrew, 2013, 2014).9 While this
doesn’t constitute a direct argument in favour of Partial Additivity, it does illustrate the cost
of denying it.
2.2 Transitivity
One consequence of Partial Additivity is that w is a transitive ordering on every set of
credence functions all of whose members are defined on the same opinion set: that is, if c, c′,
c′′ are defined on the same opinion set, and if c w c′ and c′ w c′′, then c w c′′. Our next
principle extends this latter claim to the whole universe of possible credence functions:
Transitivity Suppose c, c′, and c′′ are credence functions. Then, if c w c′ and
c′ w c′′, then c w c′′.
If a relation orders items by their all-things-considered goodness, then it is often claimed that
the transitivity of that relation is an analytic truth (Broome, 2004, Section 4.1). In Section 3.3,
we’ll consider whether we might escape the Paradox of Epistemic Utility for Credences by
denying transitivity in the way that Larry Temkin (1987) tries to escape the Mere Addition
Paradox by denying transitivity in the ethical case. At that point, we’ll take issue with the
claim that Transitivity is an analytic truth either in the epistemic or the ethical case.
2.3 No Repugnance
Our third principle denies the epistemic analogue of what is called in ethics the very repug-
nant conclusion (Arrhenius, 2003). This a consequence of total utilitarianism that is apparently
9The required strengthening is likely to look like this, where we are now ordering credence functions not
relative to a possible world, but rather relative to a probability distribution over all the possible worlds:
Partial Additivity∗ If c, c′ are credence functions defined on F , and p is a probability function,
then
c p c′ iff ∑
w
p(w) ∑
X∈F
sX(w(X), c(X)) ≤∑
w
p(w) ∑
X∈F
sX(w(X), c′(X))
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even more repugnant than the Repugnant Conclusion itself. In ethics, the Repugnant Con-
clusion says that, for any degrees of utility 0 < s < h, and for any population all of whose
members have utility higher than h, there is a better population all of whose members have
utility lower than s. The conclusion becomes more and more repugnant, it seems, as we set
h higher and higher and s lower and lower (but still positive). Thus, one consequence of
the Repugnant Conclusion is that, for any population of deliriously happy people, there is a
better population all of whose members live lives that are only just worth living. The Very
Repugnant Conclusion goes further: it says that, for any degrees of utility l < 0 < s < h,
and any population all of whose members have utility higher than h, and any finite positive
number n, there is a better population consisting of n individuals with utility lower than
l and whose remaining individuals have utility lower than s. Again, we make this more
repugnant by setting h and n higher, and s and l lower. One consequence of the Very Repug-
nant Conclusion is that, for any population of deliriously happy people, and any population
of people enduring appalling suffering, the latter population can be made to be better than
the former just by adding people whose lives are only just worth living. The Repugnant
and Very Repugnant Conclusions both follow from total utilitarianism in ethics; and their
epistemic analogues follow from Total Epistemic Utilitarianism. Thus, Total Epistemic Util-
itarianism entails that, for any degrees of epistemic utility l < 0 < s < h, and any credence
function all of whose credences have epistemic utility higher than h, and any finite positive
number n, there is a better credence function that assigns n credences that have epistemic
utility lower than l and whose remaining credences have epistemic utility lower than s. This
is the epistemic analogue of the Very Repugnant Conclusion. Here is an instance: Suppose
Phoebe has 1 million credences, all of which are extremely accurate. Then there is a credence
function that Daphne might have that assigns 1 trillion credences that are extremely inaccu-
rate and whose remaining credences are only very slightly more accurate than inaccurate,
such that Daphne’s credence function is better than Phoebe’s. This claim seems to conflict
with our epistemic intuitions. The conflict may not be as strong as in the ethical case. In the
ethical case, many people respond with revulsion to the claim that we can always compen-
sate for the extreme suffering of an enormous number of people by producing an even more
enormous number of people whose lives are only just worth living. The same response is
not appropriate in the epistemic case. But nonetheless I think there is an intuitive rejection of
the epistemic analogue of such an claim, such as that exemplified by the ranking of Daphne
above Phoebe in the example just given. Thus, for the moment, we deny it and assume
the following principle, though as I have mentioned already, we will ultimately accept Total
Epistemic Utilitarianism and the epistemic version of the Very Repugnant Conclusion that
follows from it. So, for those who do not share the intuition that the epistemic version of the
Very Repugnant Conclusion is indeed repugnant, I will ultimately argue that your intuitive
response gets things exactly right.
No Repugnance There are levels of epistemic utility l < 0 < s < h, a credence
function c† defined on F †, and a number n, such that the following holds:
(i) each credence that c† assigns has epistemic utility higher than h;
(ii) if c is a credence function defined on F ⊇ F † and |F | > n, and n of the
credences that c assigns have epistemic utility epistemic utility below l, and
the remaining credences have epistemic utility below s, then c† w c.
Thus, again assuming veritism, No Repugnance says that there’s a credence function that
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assigns only very accurate credences that is at least as good as any credence function that
assigns very inaccurate credences to n propositions and only slightly accurate credences to
all the rest. Total Epistemic Utilitarianism entails Partial Additivity and Transitivity (above)
and Benign Addition (below), but it is incompatible with No Repugnance.
2.4 Benign Addition
Our final principle is this:
Benign Addition Suppose c and c′ are credence functions on F and F ′ respec-
tively. And suppose F ⊆ F ′. Then, if
(i) For each proposition X that is in F ′ and also in F , the credence that c′ as-
signs to X has higher epistemic utility at w than the credence that c assigns
to X, and
(ii) For each proposition X that is in F ′ but not also in F , the credence that c′
assigns to X has positive epistemic utility at w,
then c w c′.
The idea is this. Suppose I change my credence function in two ways: first, I change each
of my current credences in a way that makes all of my new credences in those propositions
better than all of my old credences in those propositions; second, I assign credences to a
bunch of new propositions in a way that makes all of those new credences have positive
epistemic utility. Then, according to Benign Addition, my new credence function is at least as
good as my old one. Average Epistemic Utilitarianism entails Partial Additivity, Transitivity,
and No Repugnance (above), but it is incompatible with Benign Addition.
2.5 The Paradox of Epistemic Utility for Credences
Finally, we can state the Paradox of Epistemic Utility for Credences. It comes in the form of
the following theorem:
Theorem 4 There is no epistemic utility ordering w that satisfies Partial Additivity, Transitivity,
No Repugnance, and Benign Addition.
All other proofs in this paper are given in the Appendix. However, it will be useful to see
how this proof works so that we can refer back to particular moves later on. For that reason,
we’ll include it here.
Proof of Theorem 4. We begin with the items posited by No Repugnance. These are:
(i) a series of levels of epistemic utility l < 0 < s < h;
(ii) a number n; and
(iii) a credence function c† defined on a set of propositions F † = {X1, . . . , Xq} such that
sXi(w(Xi), c
†(Xi)) > h for all Xi in F †.
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h
Figure 1: We plot the epistemic utility of the credences assigned by c† to the propositions X1, . . . , Xq in F †.
We illustrate c† in Figure 1.
Now pick ε > 0 and l′ < l and 0 < s′′ < s′ < s. And then choose m so that
q
∑
i=1
sXi(w(Xi), c
†(Xi)) + εq + (m− q)s′′ < nl′ + (m− n)s′ (1)
By the Archimedean property of the reals, there is such an m.
Now define c†† on the set of propositions F †† = {X1, . . . , Xq, . . . , Xn, . . . , Xm} so that
(i) sXi(w(Xi), c
††(Xi)) = sXi(w(Xi), c
†(Xi)) + ε for 1 ≤ i ≤ q; and
(ii) sXi(w(Xi), c
††(Xi)) = s′′ for q < i ≤ m.
We illustrate c†† in Figure 2.
Next, define c∗ on F †† so that:
(i) sXi(w(Xi), c
∗(Xi)) = l′ for 1 ≤ i ≤ n; and
(ii) sXi(w(Xi), c
∗(Xi)) = s′ for n < i ≤ m.
We illustrate c∗ in Figure 3.
Then, by (1),
m
∑
i=1
sXi(w(Xi), c
††(Xi)) =
q
∑
i=1
sXi(w(Xi), c
†(Xi)) + εq + (m− q)s′′
< nl′ + (m− n)s′
=
m
∑
i=1
sXi(w(Xi), c
∗(Xi))
So, by Partial Additivity, c†† ≺w c∗, since both credence functions are defined on the same
set of propositions. By Benign Addition, c† w c††. And so, by Transitivity, c† ≺w c∗. And
this latter inequality contradicts No Repugnance, which gives our contradiction. 2
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Figure 2: We plot the epistemic utility of the credences assigned by c†† to the propositions X1, . . . , Xm in F ††.
X1 X2 X3 . . . Xq Xq+1 . . . Xn
Xn+1
. . . Xm
0
s′
s′′
l′
Figure 3: We plot the epistemic utility of the credences assigned by c∗ to the propositions X1, . . . , Xm in F ††.
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3 Responses to the paradox
In the next four sections, we will consider four possible responses to the Paradox stated in
the previous section. We will consider whether we might deny Benign Addition, Partial
Additivity, Transitivity, or No Repugnance.
3.1 Denying Benign Addition
Let’s begin with Benign Addition. And let us begin by noting that this principle is incompat-
ible with Average Epistemic Utilitarianism. Benign Addition is also incompatible with the
epistemic analogue of Ng’s Variable Value Principle (Ng, 1989). To introduce this principle,
we note that Total and Average Epistemic Utilitarianism are both members of the following
family of principles, which are parameterized by a function f : N→ R+:
Epistemic Utilitarianism f If c and c′ are credence functions defined on F and
F ′ respectively, then
c w c′ iff f (|F |)|F | ∑X∈F
sX(w(X), c(X)) ≤ f (|F
′|)
|F ′| ∑X′∈F ′
sX′(w(X′), c′(X′))
Total Epistemic Utilitarianism is Epistemic Utilitarianism f when f (n) is a non-constant lin-
ear function of n. Average Epistemic Utilitarianism is Epistemic Utilitarianism f when f (n) is
a constant k. The epistemic analogue of Ng’s Variable Value Principle (with parameter f ) is
Epistemic Utilitarianism f when f is a bounded, strictly increasing, strictly concave function.
The idea is that, when comparing two credence functions both defined on small opinion sets,
the Variable Value Principle (with f ) demands that they are ordered much as Total Epistemic
Utilitarianism would have them ordered; however, when comparing two credence functions
both defined on large opinion sets, the principle demands that they are ordered pretty much
in line with the demands of Average Epistemic Utilitarianism. Thus, the Variable Value
Principle is supposed to secure the best of both earlier principles. However, like Average
Epistemic Utilitarianism, it violates Benign Addition.
Perhaps this gives us reason to abandon Benign Addition? I think not. After all, it turns
out that Average Epistemic Utilitarianism and any instance of the epistemic analogue of the
Variable Value Principle also violate the following principle (Arrhenius, 2000, 251):
No Sadism There are epistemic utility levels l < 0 < s < h such that the fol-
lowing is true. Suppose c, c′, c′′ are credence functions defined on F , F ′, F ′′
respectively, where F and F ′ are disjoint, F and F ′′ are disjoint, and F ′ ⊆ F ′′
or F ′′ ⊆ F ′. Then, if
(i) Each credence that c assigns has epistemic utility above h at w,
(ii) Each credence that c′ assigns has positive epistemic utility below s at w,
(iii) Each credence that c′′ assigns has epistemic utility below l at w,
then cc′′ w cc′.10
10If c, c′ are defined on F , F ′, respectively, and F , F ′ are disjoint, then we define a new credence function cc′
on F ∪F ′ as follows: cc′(X) = c(X) if X is in F and cc′(X) = c′(X) if X is in F ′.
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That is, if, for all X in F , X′ in F ′, and X′′ in F ′′,
sX′′(w(X′′), c(X′′)) < l < 0 < sX′(w(X′), c(X′)) < h < sX(w(X), c(X))
then cc′ w cc′′.
That is, there are negative, slightly positive, and positive levels of epistemic utility such that
it is always at least as good to add credences with the slightly positive epistemic utility as
it is to add (perhaps far fewer) credences with the negative epistemic utility. Indeed, if we
try to avoid the Paradox of Epistemic Utility for Credences by denying Benign Addition,
we will see that we will also have to deny No Sadism, providing we accept the following
innocuous principle:
Addition Suppose c, c′, c′′ are credence functions defined on F , F ′, F ′′ respec-
tively, where F and F ′ are disjoint and F and F ′′ are disjoint. Then, if
(i) |F ′| < |F ′′|;
(ii) Every credence assigned by c, c′, or c′′ has positive epistemic utility;
(iii) Each credence that c assigns has higher epistemic utility than each credence
that c′ assigns; and
(iv) Each credence that c′ assigns has higher epistemic utility than each credence
that c′′ assigns;
then, if cc′ w c, then cc′′ w cc′.
The thought behind this principle is this. We start with your credence function c, all of
whose credences have positive epistemic utility. First, we add some credences to c all of
which have lower (but still positive) epistemic utility than all of the credences that c assigns.
Now suppose that doing this doesn’t improve your epistemic utility. Then, according to
Addition, adding more credences all of which have even lower epistemic utility should not
improve things either; indeed, it should make things at most as good as adding the smaller
collection of better credences. Interestingly, Total and Average Epistemic Utilitarianism both
satisfy Addition. Total Epistemic Utilitarianism satisfies it trivially because the antecedent
is never satisfied: adding credences with positive epistemic utility will always improve c.
Average Epistemic Utilitarianism satisfies it because, if the average epistemic utility of cc′ is
at most that of c, as the antecedent requires, then the average epistemic utility of cc′′ is at
most that of cc′.
We can adapt the argument of Arrhenius (2000, Section 5-6) to show that if our epistemic
utility ordering satisfies Partial Additivity, Transitivity, No Repugnance, and Addition, then
it must violate No Sadism.
Theorem 5 There is no epistemic utility ordering w that satisfies Partial Additivity, Transitivity,
No Repugnance, Addition and No Sadism.
Now, there’s nothing inconsistent about denying both Benign Addition and No Sadism.
For one thing, there are principles, such as Average Epistemic Utilitarianism and epistemic
versions of the Variable Value Principles, that entail the negation of both of them. But, on the
other hand, they both follow from the same more general and extremely plausible principle,
namely, a slightly weakened epistemic analogue of what Michael Huemer calls the Modal
Pareto Principle. Here’s the ethical version (Huemer, 2008, 903):
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Modal Pareto Principle (ethical) For any possible worlds x and y, if, from the
standpoint of self-interest, x would rationally be preferred to y by every being
who would exist either in x or in y or in both x and y, then x is better than y with
respect to utility.
The (slightly weakened) epistemic version says the following:
Modal Pareto Principle (epistemic) For any credence functions c, c′ defined on
F , F ′ respectively, if c would be strictly better than c′ from the standpoint of the
local epistemic utility at w of every proposition that is either in F or in F ′ or in
both F and F ′, then c′ w c.
If we accept that, from the point of view of local epistemic utility at w, a proposition does
better if it is assigned a credence with positive local epistemic utility than if it does not get
assigned a credence at all, and it does better if it does not get assigned a credence at all than
if it is assigned a credence with negative local epistemic utility, then the principle becomes:
Modal Pareto Principle (epistemic) Suppose c, c′ are credence functions defined
on F , F ′ respectively. And suppose
(i) For each X in F ∪F ′, sX(w(X), c′(X)) < sX(w(X), c(X));
(ii) For each X in F −F ′, 0 < sX(w(X), c(X));
(ii) For each X in F ′ −F , sX(w(X), c′(X)) < 0.
Then c′ w c.
Benign Addition and No Sadism follow from this principle.
As Huemer says, it’s hard to deny the ethical version of the Modal Pareto Principle.
I submit that it’s even more difficult to deny the epistemic version, since concerns about
equality do not arise in that case. This, then, is our argument for Benign Addition: first, if we
deny Benign Addition, we don’t in fact escape the Paradox unless we also deny No Sadism
or Addition. Furthermore, Benign Addition (like No Sadism) follows from the extremely
plausible epistemic version of the Modal Pareto Principle.
3.2 Denying Partial Additivity
The second possible response to the Paradox of Epistemic Utility for Credences is to take it to
be a new kind of argument against the sorts of trade-offs that are permitted by any account
of epistemic utility for credences that endorses Partial Additivity. We already have some
arguments against such trade-offs. The most sophisticated is due to Hilary Greaves (2013);
it is based on her example, Epistemic Imps. Here’s a version of this example:
Epistemic Imps Laia has very strong evidence in favour of the proposition My
car is in the garage. Indeed, her evidence is strong enough to support certainty in
that proposition — perhaps she’s standing in front of the car looking at it. She
also has credences in each of four propositions — There’s a set of car keys on the
kitchen table, There’s a set of car keys beside the television, There’s a set of car keys in
the bathroom, There’s a set of car keys on the cat food box. And she knows that her
mischievous friend A`gata has all four sets of car keys and that she will determine
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whether to put them in each of the places just mentioned depending on Laia’s
credence in My car is in the garage. If Laia’s credence in that proposition is greater
than 0, A`gata will toss a fair coin to decide whether to put a set of keys on the
kitchen table, she’ll toss another to decide whether to put a set of keys beside
the television, and so on. So each of the four propositions about the sets of keys
will have chance 0.5. On the other hand, if Laia has credence 0 in My car is in the
garage, then A`gata will put a set of keys in each of the locations just mentioned
for sure. So each of the four propositions about the sets of keys will have chance
1.
Thus, it seems that Laia has two options. She can have credence 1 in My car is in the garage
and 0.5 in each of the propositions about the car keys. If she does that, she will respect her
evidence concerning each proposition — her credence in My car is in the garage is justified
by the evidence of her senses; and her credences in the other propositions match the known
chances of those propositions (given her credence 1 in My car is in the garage). Or, she can
have credence 0 in My car is in the garage and credence 1 in each of the propositions about the
car keys. If she does that, she will fail to respect her evidence about the first proposition, but
she will respect it about each of the others. However, at least if we use one of the quadratic
scoring rules qα,λ introduced above, then the total epistemic utility of the former assignment
of credences — namely, 1 in My car is in the garage and 0.5 in each of the others — is less
at worlds at which Laia has those credences than the total epistemic utility of the latter
assignment — namely, 0 in My car is in the garage and 1 in each of the others — is at worlds
at which Laia has those credences. The point is that, although her credence in My car is in
the garage is much less accurate in the second case, where she assigns it 0 instead of 1, her
credences in the other propositions are much more accurate — they are assigned 1 and are
true, rather than being assigned 0.5 and being either true or false.
Now, it might seem to follow from the preceding that accounts of epistemic utility that
adhere to Partial Additivity must conclude that the former credences in this example are
irrational, while the latter are rational. And indeed, that is precisely what Greaves claims.
However, like Carr’s objections to Total and Average Epistemic Utilitarianism above, this
depends on a particular account of how we move from comparisons of the epistemic util-
ity of credence functions at possible worlds to an account of irrationality. In particular, in
Greaves’ case, as she is well aware, it depends on an application of causal decision theory in
epistemology in order to establish her conclusion. And such an application is controversial:
it is accepted by Pettigrew (ta) and, with a tweak, by Joyce (ta); but it is denied by Konek &
Levinstein (ms).
According to the response to the Paradox of Epistemic Utility for Credences that we are
considering here, the Paradox amounts to an objection to the trade-offs endorsed by Partial
Additivity; what’s more, it’s an objection that, unlike Greaves’ argument from Epistemic
Imps, does not rely on any particular account of how we derive facts about epistemic ratio-
nality from facts about epistemic utility — in particular, it does not rely on an application
of causal decision theory in epistemology. The Paradox thus turns on the fact that Partial
Additivity entails that there are pairs of credence functions, c†† and c∗, both defined on F ,
where c†† is extremely accurate on q propositions and slightly accurate on the rest, while c∗
is extremely inaccurate on n > q propositions, and slightly accurate on the rest, but such that
c†† ≺w c∗. Of course, the slightly accurate credences of c†† must be less accurate than the
slightly accurate credences of c∗, but provided we are allowed to set the size of F ourselves,
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we can choose those slightly accurate credence of c†† and c∗ so that they are as close together
as we wish.
The problem with this response is that there are clear cases in which trade-offs exist
and we wish to endorse them. Suppose I assign credence 0.6 to each of the arithmetical
propositions 1 + 1 = 2 and 2 + 2 = 4; you assign 0.59 to 1 + 1 = 2 and 0.99 to 2 + 2 = 4. It seems
clear that you are doing better than I am. But of course that’s because of a trade-off. Relative
to me, you gain much greater accuracy in the latter arithmetical propositions, but you lose a
little accuracy in the former. We naturally judge that the gain outweighs the loss, which is to
say that we agree with the verdict of Partial Additivity and permit a trade-off.
Thus, if we are to make this response to the Paradox work, we must find a way to distin-
guish legitimate trade-offs, such as this one, from illegitimate ones — that is, we must say
when the verdicts of Partial Additivity are correct and when they are not. Here is a proposal:
No increase in total epistemic utility can ever compensate for moving from a credence func-
tion that assigns some credences with very high epistemic utility and none with very low
epistemic utility to a credence function that assigns some credences with very low epistemic
utility and none with very high epistemic utility. Thus, for instance, c†† ≺w c∗ doesn’t hold,
since c†† assigns some credences with very high epistemic utility and none with very low
epistemic utility, while c∗ assigns some credences with very low epistemic utility and none
with very high. Thus, even though the total epistemic utility of c∗ is greater than that of
c††, the latter is not worse than the former because this is a case that Partial Additivity gets
wrong.
The ethical counterpart to this restriction on trade-offs could be motivated either by what
Temkin (1987) calls Perfectionism or by what we might call Anti-Sadism. The former says
that the existence of people living very good lives makes a population very good indeed; the
latter says, amongst other things, that the existence of people living utterly miserable lives
makes a population very bad indeed.
However, there are clear counterexamples to this proposal in the epistemic case. Con-
sider the following example:
More Birders Maxine and Graham are out birding. There is a scarlet tanager in
front of them. Maxine has high credence that there’s a scarlet tanager in front of
them while Graham has a very low credence in this proposition, having mistaken
the bird for a northern cardinal. However, when we consider the credences that
Maxine and Graham assign to the remaining 1 million propositions about which
they have an opinion, both are only slightly inaccurate, but Graham is slightly
more accurate than Maxine on each.
It seems natural to say that, in this case, Graham may well be doing better than Maxine.
So the principle that we just stated cannot be true in full generality. There are at least some
cases in which an increase in total epistemic utility compensates for the loss of all very highly
accurate credences and the gain of some very inaccurate credences.
Perhaps, then, it is a question of quantity. After all, in the move from Maxine’s credences
to Graham’s, we only lose one highly accurate credence and we only gain one highly inac-
curate credence. Perhaps the correct principle is that we don’t want to sacrifice many very
accurate credences and gain many very inaccurate credences in order to gain greater total ac-
curacy. However, we can use the example of Maxine and Graham to create counterexamples
to this claim as well, providing we accept the following principle:
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Monotonic Combination Suppose c1, c2 are defined on F , while c′1, c′2 are de-
fined on F ′. And suppose F and F ′ are disjoint. Then, if c1 w c2 and c′1 ≺w c′2,
then c1c′1 ≺w c2c′2.
Note that there was nothing special about the propositions on which Maxine’s and Graham’s
credences were defined that made our original counterexample plausible. Thus, we might
easily assume that there are many disjoint sets of proposition F1, . . . , Fn together with cre-
dence functions b1, . . . , bn and c1, . . . , cn defined on F1, . . . , Fn respectively such that each
bi is like Maxine’s credence function — that is, it assigns one very accurate credence and
the rest of the credences it assigns are slightly accurate — and each ci is like Graham’s —
that is, it assigns one very inaccurate credence and the rest of the credences it assigns are
slightly accurate, and slightly more accurate than Maxine’s corresponding credences. Then,
by analogy with Maxine and Graham, we might assume that bi ≺w ci. And so, by Mono-
tonic Combination, we obtain b1 . . . bn ≺w c1 . . . cn. And this gives a counterexample to the
proposal we’re considering, which says that no gain in total epistemic utility can ever com-
pensate for the loss of many very accurate credences and the gain of many very inaccurate
credences.
So it seems that the sorts of trade-off that Partial Additivity endorses and that lead to
c†† ≺w c∗ are exactly the sorts of trade-offs that we either countenance intuitively or that
follow from trade-offs that we countenance intuitively, together with plausible further prin-
ciples, such as Monotonic Combination.
3.3 Denying Transitivity
In this section, we consider whether we might escape the Paradox of Epistemic Utility for
Credences by denying that the relation w is transitive. In the ethical case, there are stan-
dardly two ways to argue for this. Let’s begin with the first, where we argue against the
transitivity of the better-than relation between populations by creating an apparent coun-
terexample. This consists of a very long sequence of populations A1, . . . , A1,000,000. The first
population, A1, contains 2 people in terrible agony. The second, A2, contains 4 people in
very slightly less terribly agony than those in A1. A3 contains 8 people in very slightly less
terribly agony than those in A3. And so on. The final population in the sequence, A1,000,000,
contains 21,000,000 people with a very mild heachache (Rachels, 1998). It is claimed that A1 is
better than A2, A2 is better than A3, A3 is better than A4, . . . A999,999 is better than A1,000,000.
After all, doubling the number of people in a population while reducing the level of suffer-
ing they each endure only by a tiny amount makes a situation worse. However, it is also
claimed that A1,000,000 is better than A1. After all, a population all of whose members are in
terribly agony is always worse than a population all of whose members merely have a mild
headache. Thus, if transitivity holds, A1 is better than itself, which is a contradiction: if A1
is better than A1, then by definition A1 is at least as good as A1 and A1 is not at least as good
as A1.
Let’s now consider the epistemic analogue. This consists of a sequence of credence func-
tions c1, . . . , c1,000,000. The first assigns only credences with extremely low epistemic utility
at w; each credence function thereafter is defined on twice as many propositions as the pre-
vious one; and each assigns credences that have only very slightly more epistemic utility
at w than those assigned by the previous one; and the final one assigns credences that all
have only very slightly negative epistemic utility at w. As in the ethical case, we would have
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c1 w c2 w . . . w c1,000,000 w c1. And again this means that Transitivity would entail
c1 w c1, which is logically impossible. The problem with the putative counterexample in
this case is that the intuition that the final credence function, c1,000,000, in the sequence is epis-
temically better than the first, c1, is not so strong. In the ethical case, we intuitively abhor
any situation in which people experience excruciating agony — we are prepared to tolerate
a great deal in order to avoid such a situation. In the epistemic case, on the other hand, the
intuitive pull is not so strong — as we saw in More Birders above. We do not have anything
like the same abhorrence of the credence function c1 as we have of the population A1. The
reason, it seems to me, is that the intuitive pull of Anti-Sadism is dramatically stronger in
the ethical case than in the epistemic case: we abhor populations that contain great suffer-
ing; we do not so strongly disvalue credence functions that assign credences with very low
epistemic utility.
This makes the epistemic case particularly vulnerable to objections that target the very
possibility of epistemic utility cycles, however formed, such as the cycle c1 w c2 w . . . w
c1,000,000 w c1 from above. We will see such an objection below. I take this objection to be
decisive. Thus, I take the putative cycle given above not to be genuine. Indeed, I take it that
c1 genuinely is better than c1,000,000, just as transitivity would suggest: it is better to be badly
wrong on just a few propositions than slightly wrong on an enormous number of them.
The second way to argue against Transitivity in the ethical case is endorsed by Larry
Temkin (1987). Temkin argues that the better-than relation between populations might be
comparative. The idea is this: There are a number of different dimensions on which we
might compare two items — two populations, perhaps, or two credence functions — that
will jointly determine an overall comparison of their goodness. These comparisons along
different dimensions must then be summarized into an overall all-things-considered better-
than relation. If we always weight the comparisons along the different dimensions in the
same way, no matter which two items we are comparing, then the all-things-considered
better-than relation will be transitive. However, Temkin claims that, at least in the case of
the better-than relation between populations, those weightings change depending on the
items we’re comparing. For instance, when we compare two populations that contain the
same number of people, we may give considerable weight to the utilities of the worst-off.
On the other hand, when we compare two populations that differ only by the addition of
people who are living lives worth living, we do not give any weight to the utilities of the
worst-off. In this way, the better-than relation is comparative, and we no longer have any
reason to think that it is transitive.
Let’s see how this might work in the epistemic case. As with the ethical case, there are
many dimensions along which we compare credence functions. We compare them by look-
ing at whether they contain any credences with very high epistemic utility — we might call
this the perfectionist dimension, following Temkin. We compare them by looking at whether
they contain any credences with very low epistemic utility — we might call this the anti-
sadist dimension, by analogy with the ethical case. And we compare them by looking at
their total epistemic utility. Now let’s consider the credence functions that feature in the
Paradox of Epistemic Utility for Credences. c†† is at least as good as c† on all dimensions of
comparison. c∗ is better than c†† on the dimension of total epistemic utility and worse on
the perfectionist and anti-sadist dimensions. c∗ is better than c† on the total epistemic utility
dimension, but worse on the perfectionist and anti-sadist dimension. Now, if we weight the
three dimensions in the same way when we compare c∗ and c† and when we compare c∗ and
c††, then we must have c† ≺w c∗ iff c†† ≺w c∗. But if we have that, then we have c† ≺w c∗,
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since Partial Additivity gives c†† ≺w c∗; and c† ≺w c∗ is precisely the consequent of the in-
stance of Transitivity that the Paradox requires. So a contradiction follows. Thus, we must
weight these three dimensions differently depending on which comparisons we’re making,
just as Temkin suggests.
By Partial Additivity, it follows that we give no weight to the perfectionist and anti-sadist
dimensions if we are comparing credence functions on the same set of propositions — just as,
in the ethical case, we pay no attention to the plight of the worst-off when we are comparing
a population and an extension of it obtained by merely adding lives worth living. However,
when we come to compare c† and c∗, we do not weight the total epistemic utility dimension
above all others. We also take account of the perfectionist and anti-sadist dimensions. And,
doing that, we conclude that c† w c∗.
Of course, once we have c∗ w c†, we have an epistemic utility cycle c† w c†† ≺w c∗ w
c†. Unlike the cycle c1 w cw w . . . w c1,000,000 w c1, this is not a strict cycle — that is, its
inequalities are not all strict. But, as we will see, both fall to the same objection. Before we
consider that objection, however, we consider another objection to intransitive better-than
orderings: this is intended to apply whether or not these orderings issue in cycles.
The objection is due to John Broome (2004, Section 4.1), who claims that it is an analytic
truth that the better-than relation is transitive. His argument targets particularly the better-
than relation between possible lives and the better-than relation between possible popula-
tions. However, if it is successful in these cases, it seems that it should be successful quite
generally; in particular, it should establish that the epistemic better-than relation between
credence functions is also transitive — that is, it should establish that our Transitivity axiom
is an analytic truth.
Broome claims that the better-than relation stands to the adjective good as the taller-than
relation stands to the adjective tall and the younger-than relation stands to the adjective
young. To say that population A is better than population B is to say that the former is
more good than the latter. And, according to Broome, the correct way to understand these
sorts of relation is as positing degrees of the property that the adjective in question picks
out — degrees of height, youth, goodness — and as saying that both relata have a degree
of the given property and that the degree of the first relatum is greater than the degree of
the second relatum. This understanding of the more-F-than (or Fer-than) relations for a
predicate F is also accepted by linguists, who incorporate the preceding analysis, complete
with its ontology of degrees of F-ness, into their semantics for such relations (Kennedy,
2001). The transitivity of the Fer-than relation is then taken to follow from the transitivity of
the greater-than relation on the set of possible degrees that are ascribed to the relata of the
Fer-than relation by the semantics. Thus, the transitivity of Fer-than — and, in particular,
the various better-than relations between possible populations, lives, and credence functions
— is an analytic truth.
The problem with this argument is that it over-generates. It relies on the assumption that
the greater-than relation on the degrees of F-ness posited by the semantics of the Fer-than
relation is itself transitive. Whence comes our confidence in this? Surely from the analogy
with the greater-than relation on the set of real numbers, which we often use to provide those
degrees — degrees of tallness, heaviness, largeness, hardness, richness, etc. are all given by
real numbers relative to a particular unit. However, if that’s right, we should be equally
confident that the greater-than relation on the set of degrees is complete — that is, for any
two degrees, the first is greater than the second, the second is greater than the first, or they
are equal. Thus, we can conclude that it is an analytic truth not only that the Fer-than relation
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is transitive for any F, but also that it is complete: that is, for any two possible items a and
b such that it is not a category mistake to ascribe F-ness to these items, it is the case that a is
Fer than b, b is Fer than a, or a is exactly as F as b. Thus, it is analytically false to say, as Ruth
Chang (2002, 2005) does, that Mozart is not more creative than Michelangelo, Michelangelo
is not more creative than Mozart, and Mozart and Michelangelo are not equally creative.
But that seems wrong. Chang’s claim is extremely plausible, and indeed certainly more
plausible than the highly theoretical claim that the greater-than relation on the degrees of
F-ness is always transitive, or indeed the more basic but still highly theoretical claim that
the semantics of the Fer-than relation always involves ascribing degrees of goodness. So
Broome’s argument fails to convince.
Nonetheless, as I intimated earlier, the Temkin-style response fails all the same. The prob-
lem is one that haunts any account that posits cyclical preferences. Let us say that an epistemic
utility cycle is a sequence of credence function c1, . . . , cn with the following properties:
(i) ci w ci+1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, and cn w c1;
(ii) ci w ci+1 for some i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, or cn w c1.
Thus, c1 w c2 w . . . w c1,000,000 w c1 and c∗ w c† w c†† ≺w c∗ are both epistemic
utility cycles.
Now, so far, we have been considering an epistemic utility ordering on credence func-
tions: these have been the items whose epistemic goodness we have compared using the
ordering. However, it is natural to think that we can extend the ordering to mixtures of these
items. Given a set of credence functions c1, . . . , cn, a mixture of those credence functions is
an option that results in the agent adopting c1 with some probability, c2 with some proba-
bility, . . . , cn with some probability. This way of creating new options out of old is familiar
from decision theory and game theory, where the old options are the acts or the strategies,
respectively, and the new options are the mixed acts and mixed strategies. Here’s some nota-
tion so that we can refer to these mixed options composed out of credence functions. Given
credence functions c1, . . . , cn and a probability distribution p1, . . . , pn (so ∑ni=1 pi = 1), we
write {p1, c1; . . . ; pn, cn} for the mixed option that gives credence function ci with probabil-
ity pi. Thus, {0.75, c; 0.25, c′} is the mixed option that gives c with probability 0.75 and c′
with probability 0.25. Now suppose we include all possible mixtures of credence functions
in the domain of our epistemic utility ordering w. What principles might govern this ex-
panded ordering? Here’s a principle that seems uncontroversial: If c1 w c2 and c′1 w c′2,
then {p, c1; 1− p, c′1} w {p, c2; 1− p, c′2} for any 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. And here’s another: If c w c′,
then {1, c} w {p, c; 1− p, c′}, for all 0 ≤ p < 1. Now, each of these putative principles is a
particular instance of a more general principle, which is also extremely plausible:
Stochastic Dominance If c1, . . . , cn, c′1, . . . , c
′
n are credence functions and
(i) ci w c′i for all i = 1, . . . , n;
(ii) ci w c′i for some i = 1, . . . , n;
then
{p1, c1; . . . ; pn, cn} w {p1, c′1; . . . ; pn, c′n}
for any 0 < p1, . . . , pn < 1 with ∑ni=1 pi = 1.
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However, the problem is that Stochastic Dominance rules out cycles.11
Theorem 6 There is no epistemic utility ordering w on mixed options that contains an epistemic
utility cycle amongst the unmixed options and that satisfies Stochastic Dominance.
Epistemic utility cycles, then, are ruled out by general principles that are more plausible than
the considerations that lead us to posit the cycles in the first place. So, it seems, we should
not try to escape the Paradox by denying Transitivity.
3.4 Denying No Repugnance
In previous sections, we have considered trying to escape the Paradox of Epistemic Utility
for Credences by rejecting Partial Additivity or Transitivity or Benign Addition. In this final
section, we consider rejecting No Repugnance. That is, we consider accepting the epistemic
version of the Very Repugnant Conclusion. For the veritist, this means that we consider
accepting that, for any credence function that assigns only very accurate credences, and any
credence function that assigns only very inaccurate credences, we can extend the latter by
adding only very slightly accurate credences so that it ends up better than the former.
Now, recall that the epistemic version of the Very Repugnant Conclusion is a conse-
quence of Total Epistemic Utilitarianism. But the implication doesn’t run in the other di-
rection — rejecting No Repugnance and accepting the Very Repugnant Conclusion does not
commit us to setting the epistemic utility ordering of two credence functions in line with
their total epistemic utilities. Nonetheless, if we accept two of the principles that give rise
to the Very Repugnant Conclusion via the Paradox of Epistemic Utility for Credences —
namely, Benign Addition and Transitivity — together with a slight strengthening of the third
— Partial Additivity — and two new principles — Malign Addition and Order Continuity,
stated below — then we can infer Total Epistemic Utilitarianism.
Malign Addition Suppose c and c′ are credence functions on F and F ′ respec-
tively. And suppose F ⊆ F ′. Then, if
(i) For each proposition X that is in F ′ and also in F , the credence that c′ as-
signs to X has lower epistemic utility at w than the credence that c assigns
to X, and
(ii) For each proposition X that is in F ′ but not also in F , the credence that c′
assigns to X has negative epistemic utility at w,
then c w c′.
Like Benign Addition, Malign Addition follows from the epistemic version of the Modal
Pareto Principle stated in Section 3.1 above.
Order Continuity Suppose that c1, c2, . . . is an infinite sequence of credence func-
tions on F and c is also a credence function on F . We say that cn approaches c as n
tends to infinity (and write limn→∞ cn = c) if
(∀ε > 0)(∃N)(∀M > N)(∀X ∈ F ) [|sX(w(X), cM(X))− sX(w(X), c(X))| < ε]
Then, suppose c∗ is also a credence function on F .
11The result is inspired by (Gustafsson, 2010), which is concerned with producing money-pump arguments
against non-strict preference cycles.
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• If limn→∞ cn = c and cn w c∗ for all n, then c w c∗.
• If limn→∞ cn = c and cn w c∗ for all n, then c w c∗.
This says that, if each member of a sequence of credence functions whose local epistemic
utilities come arbitrarily close to those of c is at most as good as c∗, then c is at most as good
as c∗; and if each member of a sequence of credence functions whose local epistemic utilities
come arbitrarily close to those of c is at least as good as c∗, then c is at least as good as c∗. That
is, you can’t have a sequence of credence functions all no better than c∗ but approaching a
limit that is better than c∗; and you can’t have a sequence of credence functions all no worse
than c∗ but approaching a limit that is worse than c∗.
Here is the slight strengthening of Partial Additivity. It drops the requirement that c and
c′ are defined on the same set of propositions, and replaces it with the weaker requirement
that c and c′ are defined on the same number of propositions.
Partial Additivity+ If c, c′ are credence functions defined on F , F ′ respectively,
and |F | = |F ′|, then
c w c′ iff ∑
X∈F
sX(w(X), c(X)) ≤ ∑
X′∈F ′
sX′(w(X′), c′(X′))
We now have the following theorem:
Theorem 7 Benign Addition + Malign Addition + Partial Additivity+ + Transitivity + Order Con-
tinuity + Utility Continuity + Truth-Directedness⇒ Total Epistemic Utilitarianism
Thus, if we deny No Repugnance because we accept the other principles that give rise to the
Paradox of Epistemic Utility for Credences, we are very close to accepting Total Epistemic
Utilitarianism.
Why should we accept the other principles and deny No Repugnance? That is, why
should we accept the epistemic version of the Very Repugnant Conclusion — and perhaps
further Total Epistemic Utilitarianism, from which the Very Repugnant Conclusion follows
— rather than rejecting Transitivity, Benign Addition, or Partial Additivity? There are three
approaches we might adopt when answering this question.
The first is a very crude cost-benefit analysis: we weigh the intuitive pull of each of
the four principles that make up the Paradox of Epistemic Utility for Credences against the
others; and we claim that No Repugnance has least intuitive support. I believe this analysis
is correct, but the strength of the intuitive support that a principle enjoys is notoriously
difficult to measure, and it is notoriously difficult even to make comparisons in terms of
intuitive support. Furthermore, these comparisons may vary from one person to another.
Our second strategy is a more sophisticated cost-benefit analysis. We add to our intuitive
reactions to these principles also the considerations we have adduced in favour of the three
of them other than No Repugnance in the preceding sections. For instance, we might note
that Benign Addition follows from the very plausible epistemic version of the Modal Pareto
Principle; and we might observe that the standard objections to Transitivity issue in utility
cycles, which are ruled out by the very plausible principle of Stochastic Dominance.
This argument in favour of accepting the other axioms and consequently denying No Re-
pugnance is much stronger than the first. But I wish to strengthen it yet further by combining
it with a third sort of argument, namely, a debunking argument. That is, as well as appealing
to the positive intuitions and arguments in favour of the other principles, I wish to give a
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negative argument that targets the intuition in favour of No Repugnance — I want to give
a debunking explanation for that intuition that thereby undermines it.12 Recall the example
of Daphne and Phoebe from Section 2.3 above. In it, Phoebe has 1 million credences, each of
which is extremely accurate; Daphne, in contrast, has 1 trillion credences, each of which is ex-
tremely inaccurate, as well as many other credences, each of which is only slightly accurate.
The Very Repugnant Conclusion claims that, in such a situation, Daphne’s credal state might
be better than Phoebe’s. Our intuition, it seems, ranks Phoebe’s credal state above Daphne’s.
I claim that our intuitions get this wrong. Here is my debunking explanation for this error: I
claim that we intuitively reject the correct ordering of Daphne above Phoebe — to the extent
that we do — because we make our judgment about the epistemic utility of their respective
credal states by appealing directly to our judgment concerning the pragmatic utilities of those
states. That is, when asked to rank Phoebe and Daphne’s credal states in terms of their epis-
temic goodness, we defer to our ranking of them in terms of their pragmatic goodness. Now,
what is the pragmatic goodness or utility of a certain set of credences? Well, since credences,
together with utilities, give rise to our rational decisions, the pragmatic utility of our credal
state is the pragmatic utility of the outcomes of the decisions that we use it to make — this
is the insight of so-called ‘Dutch Book’ arguments for Probabilism and Conditionalization.
Now it seems correct to say that Phoebe’s credences will guide her better in the world than
Daphne’s will. For a huge number of propositions, Daphne will go wrong in very many
decisions that turn on her attitudes to those propositions. And for many others, she will not
go right much more often than if she were simply to toss a coin. Phoebe, in contrast, will go
right very often when the decision turns on a proposition to which she assigns a credence.
For these reasons, I submit, we judge that Phoebe’s credences are better than Daphne’s in
terms of their pragmatic utility. I also claim that, when we are asked which, if either, is bet-
ter in terms of their epistemic utility, we defer to this judgment. Why do we do that? For
two reasons, I think. First, doing so is a reliable method by which to make such a judgment.
Since, in normal cases, we get what we want just in case we accurately represent the world,
high pragmatic utility is a reliable indicator of high epistemic utility, low pragmatic utility
is a reliable indicator of low epistemic utility, and so on. Second, it is cognitively easier to
assess a credal state for its pragmatic utility than for its epistemic utility. This is because it is
easier cognitively to simulate the concrete consequences of having a given set of credences
and assess the pragmatic utility of those consequences than it is to calculate or estimate the
more abstract quantity of epistemic utility.
This, then, debunks the intuition in favour of No Repugnance. By doing so, we clear the
way for denying No Repugnance and accepting the epistemic version of the Very Repug-
nant Conclusion. However, as we saw in Theorem 7 above, if we accept the remaining three
axioms that make up the Paradox, together with some further related plausible principles,
it is not just the Very Repugnant Conclusion that we must accept, but also Total Epistemic
Utilitarianism. And, as we saw in Section 1.2, Jennifer Carr has identified some unpalatable
consequences of Total Epistemic Utilitarianism when it is combined with natural decision-
theoretic principles. Recall: Theorem 2 teaches us that, if we accept Total Epistemic Utilitari-
anism, we face a dilemma. Either (a) for any non-zero credence, there is a proposition whose
epistemically neutral credence is lower than that, or (b) there is a credence r and an open
proposition X such that any credence function that assigns r to X is strictly dominated. As
we saw in Section 1.2 above, the former flies in the face of veritism, while the latter seems to
12This approach was inspired by a comment from an anonymous referee for this journal.
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pose problems for accuracy-first arguments for Probabilism, as well as related arguments for
other credal norms, such as Conditionalization and the Principal Principle. I wish to argue
that, while (a) is unsupportable, (b) is acceptable and poses no problem for the accuracy-first
arguments in question.
To introduce the idea behind my argument, compare the following three cases:
• Memory I expect that, if I were to remember more past experiences than I do, and if I
were to remember those I do more accurately than I do, I would have more accurate
credences than I do.
• Evidence I expect that, if I were to collect more evidence than I currently have, I would
have more accurate credences than I do.
• Opinions If option (b) above is true, then there is a credence r and a proposition X such
that if I currently assign r to X, then there is some a priori knowable way to alter my
opinion set and credence function such that, if I were to undertake this alteration, I
would be guaranteed to have more accurate credences than I do.
In the first two cases, we tend not to judge me irrational on the basis that there’s some-
thing epistemic I could do that I can expect to be better for me, epistemically speaking — as
Williamson (1998, 98) says, “Forgetting is not irrational; it is just unfortunate”. Perhaps, then,
for the same reason, we should not judge me irrational in the third case, where there’s some-
thing epistemic I could do that is guaranteed to improve my credal state from the purely
epistemic point of view.
I think that’s right. But why? Here’s my proposed explanation. When we give certain
norms that govern credences, such as Probabilism or Conditionalization, we are clearly not
claiming that having non-probabilistic credences or updating by a rule other than condition-
alization is always all-things-considered irrational. After all, I might be in a situation in which
violating Probabilism is the only way to save the lives of my loved ones; and in such a sit-
uation, it is all-things-considered rational to save the lives of my loved ones at the expense
of the coherence of my credences. Rather, we are claiming that norms such as Probabilism
and Conditionalization are epistemic norms that govern assignments of credences. They are not
all-things-considered norms that govern an agent’s actions in general. Seeing them as epistemic
norms that govern assignments of credences has two consequences. First, the fact that we
are focussing on purely epistemic rationality entails that, when we apply the principles of de-
cision theory to derive facts about the rationality of the options we are assessing from facts
about their value, it is their purely epistemic value that we will consider — we will simply
ignore their practical or moral or aesthetic value. Second, the fact that we are focussing on
the rationality of assignments of credences entails that certain other sorts of epistemic actions
— such as collecting more evidence or improving our memory to provide more support for
our credences, or altering the opinion set to whose members we assign those credences — are
not included as available options in the decision problem we use to assess the rationality of
the assignments. The point is that, when we focus on the all-things-considered rationality of
an option, we assess it using a decision problem with two features: first, the utility function
measures all-things-considered (or overall) value, combining epistemic value with practical
value and moral value and aesthetic value and so on; second, the set of available options
includes, roughly speaking, anything that it is physically possible for the agent to do. When,
instead, we narrow down our focus to what is practically rational or what is epistemically
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rational, we still use decision theory to carry out our assessment, but the decision problem
we use differs in both of these features: we restrict the sort of value measured by the utility
function; and we restrict the options available to the agent. When it is the epistemic rational-
ity of assignments of credences that we are using the decision problem to assess, we allow
our utility function to measure only epistemic value; and we consider as available options
only other assignments of credences to the same propositions.
One attractive feature of this account is that it explains why we sometimes do, nonethe-
less, impugn the rationality of an agent who doesn’t take free evidence, or who refuses a
free pill that will improve her memory with no side effects, or who doesn’t make a cost-free
change to her opinion set that is guaranteed to improve her epistemic utility. The explanation
is this: in these cases, we have shifted from evaluating the epistemic rationality of an assign-
ment of credences; instead, we are evaluating the overall or all-things-considered rationality
of an agent’s total doxastic state, which includes her evidence (including the evidence she
obtains from her memory) and her opinion set. As a result, we expand the space of available
options in the decision problem that we use to evaluate the rationality of the agent’s current
state. There are now new options, such as altering your opinion set or collecting new evi-
dence. Now, it might seem that, by expanding the set of options in this way, we will return
to the situation we had above, where each option is dominated. However much evidence I
gather, I could have gathered more; and I expect that doing so would have increased by epis-
temic utility. This would be a problem if we were still evaluating these options using only
their epistemic utility. But we are now considering also their practical utility, and of course
gathering new evidence often comes at a cost — it takes time and energy to investigate the
world — as does altering one’s opinion set — it takes time and energy to formulate any new
propositions you introduce as well as space to retain them, and it takes time and energy to
ignore any old propositions you wish to jettison. Thus, while we sometimes criticise some-
one who refuses free evidence or who fails to make a cost-free change to her opinion set
that is guaranteed to increase her epistemic utility, we recognise that there are other times
when sticking with her current evidence and her current opinion set maximizes (expected)
all-things-considered utility, which is the relevant utility when making this assessment of
the agent’s total doxastic state, rather than simply her assignment of credences.
Thus, in conclusion, while Total Epistemic Utilitarianism might entail that many prob-
abilistic credence functions are strictly dominated with respect to accuracy, this does not
undermine the accuracy-first arguments that have been given for Probabilism, Condition-
alization, and so on. After all, these norms are epistemic norms that govern assignments
of credences: this means that the only available options in the decision problem we use to
evaluate a given assignment of credences includes other assignments to the same set of propo-
sitions. And, once we recognise that, Joyce’s argument goes through. After all, provided
our epistemic utility function has certain properties that we outlined in Section 1.1.3, and
providing our epistemic utility ordering satisfies Total Epistemic Utilitarianism, each non-
probabilistic credence function is strictly dominated by a probabilistic credence function de-
fined on the same opinion set; and no probabilistic credence function is strictly dominated
by any credence function defined on the same opinion set (Joyce, 1998, 2009; Predd et al.,
2009; Pettigrew, 2016).
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4 Conclusion
To summarize: I propose that our epistemic Theory X is Total Epistemic Utilitarianism. It
follows from Benign Addition, Malign Addition, Transitivity, Partial Additivity, and Order
and Utility Continuity. And, while it entails the Very Repugnant Conclusion (that is, the
negation of No Repugnance), that is independently the conclusion of Benign Addition, Tran-
sitivity, and Partial Additivity, each of which it is more costly to deny than No Repugnance.
The most troubling feature of Total Epistemic Utilitarianism for whose of us who wish to
preserve the accuracy-first arguments for Probabilism, Conditionalization, etc. is the conse-
quence identified by Theorem 2. However, as we saw in the previous section, it is possible
to preserve these accuracy arguments even in the presence of the most worrying possible
consequences of that theorem. The population ethics for credence, therefore, is simply the
epistemic analogue of total utilitarianism in ethics.
As I mentioned at the beginning, this paper is intended as a case study in the popu-
lation ethics of doxastic states. We have focussed only on credences; and we have taken
their epistemic utility to be exhausted by their accuracy. Thus, future work might gener-
alise this framework along these two dimensions. We might consider alternative sorts of
doxastic state: full beliefs, primitive conditional credences, imprecise credences, compar-
ative credences, etc. And we might consider a less austere roster of sources of epistemic
value: matching evidential probabilities, constituting understanding, constituting knowl-
edge, formed by a reliable process, etc. There is no reason to think that the same problems
arise nor that the same solution will be best in all of these different cases.
Appendix: Proofs of theorems
Proposition 1 Suppose that s is truth-directed and continuous. Then every
proposition has an epistemically neutral credence.
Proof. Let X be a proposition. Since s is truth-directed and continuous sX(1, x) is a continu-
ous, strictly increasing function of x and sX(1, x) is a continuous, strictly decreasing function
of x. Moreover, s(1, 0) < s(0, 0) but s(1, 1) > s(0, 1). So the functions s(1, x) and s(0, x) must
intersect at exactly one point between 0 and 1 — let us call the point of their intersection rX.
So s(1, rX) = s(0, rX), as required. 2
Theorem 2 Suppose that s is truth-directed, strictly proper, and continuous. And
suppose that the epistemic utility ordering w is governed by Total Epistemic
Utilitarianism. Then either:
(a) For all ε > 0, there is a proposition X such that 0 ≤ rX < ε;
OR
(b) There is a credence x and an open proposition X such that every credence
function that assigns x to X is strictly dominated.
Proof. First, note that one of the following two must hold:
(i) There is an open proposition X such that the epistemically neutral credence rX for X is
guaranteed to have negative epistemic utility — that is, sX(w(X), rX) = sX(w′(X), rX) <
0, for all w, w′.
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(ii) For all open propositions X, the epistemically neutral credence rX for X is guaranteed
to have non-negative epistemic utility — that is, sX(w(X), rX) = sX(w′(X), rX) ≥ 0 for
all w, w′.
If (i), then (b) follows from Total Epistemic Utilitarianism. After all, suppose c is defined on
an opinion set F that contains X. And suppose c(X) = rX. Then define c− on the opinion
set F− = F − {X} so that c−(Y) = c(Y) for all Y in F−. Then
∑
Y∈F
sY(w(Y), c(Y)) = sX(w(X), c(X)) + ∑
Y∈F−
sY(w(Y), c(Y))
= sX(w(X), rX) + ∑
Y∈F−
sY(w(Y), c(Y))
< ∑
Y∈F−
sY(w(Y), c(Y))
= ∑
Y∈F−
s(w(Y), c−(Y))
So, by Total Epistemic Utilitarianism, c ≺w c∗ for all worlds w.
Thus, we assume (ii). What’s more, we assume that (a) is false; we will then show that
(b) follows. In fact, we show that, if (ii) is true and (a) is false, then every credence function is
strictly dominated; thus, there is certainly a credence x and an open proposition X such that
every credence function that assigns x to X is strictly dominated.
If (ii) is true and (a) is false, and c is a credence function on F , then there are mutually
exclusive open propositions X1, . . . , Xn that are not included in F such that the sum of their
epistemically neutral credences exceeds 1 — that is, ∑ni=1 rXi > 1. Then we will define c
′ on
the opinion set F ′ = F ∪{X1, . . . , Xn} that is obtained by extending F to include X1, . . . , Xn.
We will let c′ agree with c on F , so that c′(X) = c(X) for all X in F . And we will let c′ assign
to each Xi its epistemically neutral credence rXi , so that c
′(Xi) = rXi for all i = 1, . . . , n. Then,
for all worlds w,
∑
X′∈F ′
sX′(w(X′), c′(X′)) = ∑
X∈F
sX(w(X), c(X)) +
n
∑
i=1
sXi(w(Xi), rXi)
≥ ∑
X∈F
sX(w(X), c(X))
since s(w(Xi), rXi) = s(w
′(Xi), rXi) ≥ 0 for all worlds w, w′. Now, notice that c′ is non-
probabilistic. After all, it assigns credences to a set of mutually exclusive propositions whose
sum exceeds 1. Thus, since s is continuous and strictly proper, we can appeal to the main the-
orem of (Predd et al., 2009, Theorem 1), which says that, for any non-probabilistic credence
function on an opinion set, there is another credence function on the same opinion set such
that the sum of the local epistemic utilities of the latter exceeds the sum of the local epistemic
utilities of the former at all worlds. Thus, there is a credence function c∗ also defined on F ′
such that
∑
X′∈F ′
sX′(w(X′), c′(X′)) < ∑
X′∈F ′
sX′(w(X′), c∗(X′))
for all w. Putting the last two inequalities together, we get:
∑
X∈F
sX(w(X), c(X)) < ∑
X′∈F ′
sX′(w(X′), c∗(X′)) (2)
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And thus, by Total Epistemic Utilitarianism, c ≺w c∗ for all worlds w. So c is strictly dom-
inated. Now, this holds for any credence function c; a fortiori there is a credence x and an
open proposition X such that any credence function that assigns x to X is strictly dominated.
This completes our proof. We showed that (i) entails (b); and (ii) together with the denial
of (a) entails (b) as well. 2
Theorem 3 Suppose that s is truth-directed. And suppose that the epistemic
utility ordering w is governed by Average Epistemic Utilitarianism. Then, any
credence function that assigns any non-extremal credences is strictly dominated.
Proof. Suppose c is defined on F and c assigns some non-extremal credences. Then we will
define a credence function c∗ on an opinion set F ∗ as follows. Let > be a tautology. Suppose
s(1, 1) ≥ s(0, 0). Then let F ∗ = {>} and let c∗(>) = 1. Then, by Truth-Directedness, we
have that, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and all worlds w, s>(w(>), 1) > sX(w(X), x). So, since c assigns
some non-extremal credences, s>(w(>), 1) ≥ sX(w(X), c(X)) for all X in F and all w, and
s>(w(>), 1) > sX(w(X), c(X)) for some X in F and all w. Then
1
|F ∗| ∑X∈F ∗
sX(w(X), c∗(X)) = s>(w(>), 1) = 1|F | ∑X∈F
s(w(>), 1) > 1|F | ∑X∈F
sX(w(X), c(X))
And similarly, if s⊥(0, 0) ≥ s(1, 1), then let ⊥ be a contradiction and define c∗ on F ∗ = {⊥}
with c∗(⊥) = 0. 2
Theorem 6 There is no epistemic utility ordering w on mixed options that con-
tains an epistemic utility cycle amongst the unmixed options and that satisfies
Stochastic Dominance.
Proof. Suppose c1, . . . , cn is an epistemic utility cycle on the unmixed options. Then let
c′1 = c2, c
′
2 = c3, c
′
3 = c4, . . . , c
′
n−1 = cn, c
′
n = c1. Then, since c1, . . . , cn is a cycle,
(i) ci w c′i for all i = 1, . . . , n;
(ii) ci w c′i for some i = 1, . . . , n;
So by Stochastic Dominance, we have{
1
n
, c1; . . . ;
1
n
, cn
}
w
{
1
n
, c′1; . . . ;
1
n
, c′n
}
=
{
1
n
, c2; . . . ;
1
n
, cn;
1
n
c1
}
=
{
1
n
, c1; . . . ;
1
n
, cn
}
But this gives a contradiction, since there can be no option strictly better than itself. 2
Theorem 7 Benign Addition + Malign Addition + Transitivity + Partial Additivity+
+ Order Continuity + Utility Continuity + Truth-Directedness⇒ Total Epistemic
Utilitarianism
Proof. First, for a credence function c defined on F , let Totalw(c) = ∑X∈F sX(w(X), c(X)).
Suppose c, c′ are defined on F , F ′, respectively. There are then four cases to consider:
• Suppose |F | = |F ′|. And suppose Totalw(c) < / = / > Totalw(c′). Then, by Partial
Additivity, c ≺w / ∼w / w c′.
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• Suppose |F | < |F ′| and Total(c) < Total(c′). Then it is possible to find c∗ with the
following properties: (i) c∗ is obtained by extending c to an opinion set the same size
as F ′; (ii) c∗ constitutes a benign addition to c; (iii) Totalw(c∗) < Totalw(c′). Thus, by
(i), (iii), and Partial Additivity+, we have c∗ ≺w c′. By Benign Addition and (ii), we
have c w c∗. And by Transitivity, we have c ≺w c′, as required.
• Suppose |F | < |F ′| and Total(c) > Total(c′). Then it is possible to find c∗ with the
following properties: (i) c∗ is obtained by extending c to an opinion set the same size
as F ′; (ii) c∗ constitutes a malign addition to c; (iii) Totalw(c∗) > Totalw(c′). Thus, by
(i), (iii), and Partial Additivity+, we have c∗ w c′. By Malign Addition and (ii), we
have c w c∗. And by Transitivity, we have c w c′, as required.
• Suppose |F | < |F ′| and Total(c) = Total(c′). Then let c∗ be a credence function that
is obtained by extending c to an opinion set F ∗ that is the same size as F ′ such that,
for each X not in F , the epistemic utility of the credence that c∗ assigns to X is 0 —
such a credence exists by Truth-Directedness and Utility Continuity. Thus, Totalw(c) =
Totalw(c∗) = Totalw(c′). So, by Partial Additivity+, c∗ ∼w c′. We now show that
c ∼w c∗. Then there is a sequence of credence functions, c1, c2, . . . with the following
properties: (i) each cn is obtained by extending c to F ∗; (ii) each cn constitutes a malign
addition to c; (iii) limn→∞ cn = c∗. By (i) and (ii) and Malign Addition, cn w c. By (iii)
and Continuity, c∗ w c. Similarly, there is a sequence of credence functions, c1, c2, . . .
with the following properties: (i) each cn is obtained by extending c to F ∗; (ii) each
cn constitutes a benign addition to c; (iii) limn→∞ cn = c∗. By (i) and (ii) and Benign
Addition, cn w c. By (iii) and Continuity, c∗ w c. Putting these together, we have
c∗ ∼w c. Combining this with c∗ ∼w c′, we get c ∼w c′, as required.
This completes our proof, since the four cases exhaust all the possibilities. 2
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